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This paper reports an experiment in over 3,000 Indonesian villages designed to test the role of performance
incentives in improving the efficacy of aid programs. Villages in a randomly-chosen one-third of subdistricts
received a block grant to improve 12 maternal and child health and education indicators, with the size
of the subsequent year’s block grant depending on performance relative to other villages in the subdistrict.
Villages in remaining subdistricts were randomly assigned to either an otherwise identical block grant
program with no financial link to performance, or to a pure control group. We find that the incentivized
villages performed better on health than the non-incentivized villages, particularly in less developed
areas, but found no impact of incentives on education. We find no evidence of negative spillovers
from the incentives to untargeted outcomes, and no evidence that villagers manipulated scores. The
relative performance design was crucial in ensuring that incentives did not result in a net transfer of
funds toward richer areas. Incentives led to what appear to be more efficient spending of block grants,
and led to an increase in labor from health providers, who are partially paid fee-for-service, but not
teachers. On net, between 50-75% of the total impact of the block grant program on health indicators
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1.  Introduction 
A recent movement throughout the world has sought to improve the links between 
development aid and performance. For example, the United Nations has sought to focus 
developing country governments on improving human development and poverty alleviation by 
defining and measuring progress against the Millennium Development Goals. Even more 
directly, foreign assistance given out by the U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation is explicitly 
conditioned on recipient countries meeting 17 indicators of good governance, ranging from civil 
liberties to immunization rates to girl’s primary education rates to inflation (Birdsall and 
Savedoff 2009). The World Bank is similarly moving towards “Program for Results” loans, 
which would condition actual World Bank disbursements on results obtained. The idea of linking 
aid to performance is not limited to the developing world: the U.S. has used a similar approach to 
encourage state-based education and local school performance reform through its Race To The 
Top and No Child Left Behind programs. 
As in any principal-agent framework, linking aid to performance can be useful from the 
principal’s perspective to the extent it creates incentives for lower tiers of government to 
improve effort and mobilize additional resources. But there are potential pitfalls as well. As with  
all incentive schemes, there can be multitasking problems, where effort allocated towards 
targeted indicators comes at the expense of other, non-incentivized indicators that the principal 
may also care about (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991). There can also be direct attempts to 
manipulate indicators to increase payouts (Linden and Shastry forthcoming). And – particularly 
when government budgets are being allocated based on performance – there is a substantial risk 2 
that performance-based aid will mean that budgets are directed to richer or otherwise better 
performing locations. If these richer or better performing regions have a lower marginal value of 
funds, this reallocation could offset some of the incentive effects. 
To investigate these issues, we designed a randomized field experiment in the context of 
an aid program in Indonesia that seeks to improve maternal and child health and education and 
that incorporates explicit performance incentives. Under the program, known as Generasi, 
villages receive an annual block grant of approximately US $10,000, which each village can 
allocate to any activity that supported one of 12 indicators of health and education service 
delivery (such as prenatal and postnatal care, childbirth assisted by trained personnel, 
immunizations, school enrollment, and school attendance). To give communities incentives to 
focus on the most effective policies, 20% of the subsequent year’s block grant is allocated among 
villages in a subdistrict based on their relative performance on each of the 12 targeted health and 
education indicators. To test the impact of the performance incentives, the experiment 
randomized entire subdistricts to either receive the program with incentives, or to receive an 
otherwise identical program without the performance incentives. Other than the performance 
incentives, the two versions of the program – with and without performance incentives – were 
identical down to the last detail (e.g. amounts of money, target indicators, facilitation manuals, 
monitoring tools, information presented to villagers, etc). The experimental design thus precisely 
identifies the impact of the performance incentives.  
A total of 264 subdistricts, each consisting of approximately 12 villages, were 
randomized into either a pure control group or one of two versions of the program. Surveys were 
conducted at baseline, 18 months after the program started, and 30 months after the program 
started. With over 2,100 villages randomized to receive either the incentivized or non-3 
incentivized version of the Generasi program (plus over 1,000 villages in control subdistricts), 
and over 1.8 million target beneficiaries of the program in treatment areas, to the best of our 
knowledge this represents one of the largest randomized social experiments conducted in the 
world to date. 
We begin by examining the impact of the incentives on the 12 main indicators the 
program was designed to address. Using data from the household survey, we find that the 
incentives led to greater performance on the health indicators, but not on the education 
indicators. Over the two years of the program, the 8 targeted maternal and child indicators (e.g., 
prenatal visits, delivery by trained midwives, childhood immunizations, growth monitoring) 
were an average of 0.03 standard deviations higher in incentivized areas than in non-incentivized 
areas. This was driven by prenatal visits, which were 5% higher in incentivized areas than non-
incentivized areas, and immunization rates, which were 3% higher in incentivized areas than 
non-incentivized areas. While these differences are modest, the impact of the incentives was 
more pronounced in areas with low baseline levels of service delivery: the incentives improved 
the 8 targeted maternal and child health indicators by an average of 0.06 standard deviations for 
a subdistrict at the 10
th percentile at baseline, and by as much as 0.10 – 0.15 standard deviations 
in the poorer, off Java provinces. On net, between 50-75% of the program’s impact on health 
indicators came from the incentivized areas: for example, on average the 8 target health 
indicators were 0.052 standard deviations higher than pure controls in incentivized areas, 
compared to only 0.020 standard deviations higher than controls in non-incentivized areas. While 
the Generasi program overall improved enrollments after two years of implementation, there 
were no differences between incentivized and non-incentivized areas on the 4 education 
indicators examined (primary and junior secondary enrollment and attendance).  4 
We find no evidence of adverse effects of the incentives. We find no evidence of a multi-
tasking problem across the wide variety of non-incentivized metrics we examine: incentive areas 
were comparable or better than non-incentivized areas in terms of quality of health care services, 
use of adult health care services, good childcare and parenting practices, high school enrollment, 
enrollment in alternative forms of education, and child labor. We find no evidence that 
immunization recordkeeping, school attendance records, or program scores were manipulated in 
performance zones relative to non-performance incentive zones. And, we find that by making the 
incentive payments relative to other villages in the same subdistrict, the program prevented the 
incentives from resulting in a net transfer of funds to richer villages. 
We investigate four potential mechanisms through which the incentives may have had an 
impact: changes in the composition of spending, worker effort, community effort, and targeting 
of benefits within the community. We find two main channels through which the incentives may 
have had an impact. First, the incentives led to a reallocation of the block grants away from 
school supplies and uniforms (4 percentage points lower, or about 16 percent) and towards health 
expenditures (3 percentage points higher, or about 6.5 percent). Despite the reallocation of funds 
away from school supplies and uniforms, households were in fact no less likely to receive these 
items and did not report that they were of lower quality, and were in fact more likely to receive 
education scholarships in the performance areas. This suggests that the changes in budgets may 
reflect more efficient use of funds rather than cutting down on quantity or quality. Second, we 
find that the performance incentives led to an increase in the labor of midwives, who are the 
major providers of the incentivized maternal and child health services (1.7 hours more over a 3 
days recall window, or about 6 percent). By contrast, we found no change in labor supplied by 
teachers. One possible explanation is that midwives are paid on a fee for service basis for many 5 
of the services they provide (e.g., pre and post natal care, deliveries), whereas teachers are not. 
We find no changes in community effort or the targeting of benefits within villages. 
Interpreting the magnitudes we find is hard without some notion of the program’s costs. 
To examine this, we perform a cost-effectiveness calculation. A general problem in cost-
effectiveness calculations with multiple outcomes is that one needs to weight the various 
outcomes. In our case, we use the program’s weights for each of the 12 indicators, which 
presumably reflect some notion of the government’s relative weights among the indicators, to 
calculate a cost per “bonus point” achieved. Overall, the Generasi program cost about $8 - $11 
per “bonus point.” Translating “bonus points” into outcomes suggests, for example, that the cost 
of an additional child weight check is $16 - $22, the cost of preventing one malnourished child 
was $384 - $528, and the cost of enrolling one more child in primary school was $200 - $275. 
We show that these costs are similar to a traditional conditional cash transfer program 
implemented in Indonesia at the same time and evaluated using comparable methodologies, 
though are substantially more expensive than several recent interventions in Kenya and India 
aimed at improving school enrollment by improving health or providing school inputs (Dhaliwal 
et al. 2011). When we isolate the cost-effectiveness of the incentives, however, we obtain 
numbers on the order of $0.60 per point. This is because the incentives cost almost nothing: the 
total amount of money was held fixed between the incentivized and non-incentivized versions of 
the program, the marginal cost of collecting performance data was very low since program 
facilitators would have been there anyway administering the block grant, and the incentives just 
changed how the block grant was apportioned among communities. Thus, even though the 
impact of the performance incentives on outcomes was relatively modest, the results suggest that 
performance incentives can be a cost effective way of improving aid effectiveness. 6 
This study is part of a newly expanding literature that seeks to identify the impact of 
performance incentives on health and education in developing countries, holding the amount of 
resources given constant. In the context of conditional cash transfers programs, Baird, McIntosh 
and Ozler (2011) find that adding conditions to a household-based CCT program Malawi 
reduced school dropouts and improved English comprehension. In health, Basinga et al. (2011), 
find that pay-for-performance for health clinics in Rwanda yields positive impacts of 
performance incentives on institutional deliveries, preventive health visits for young children, 
and quality of prenatal care, but not on the quantity of prenatal care or immunizations. The 
present study is unique in that incentives are provided to an entire community, and the 
performance incentives influenced the amount of future aid. This allows for quite substantial 
flexibility in budgetary responses to the aid (and indeed, we find evidence that changes in budget 
allocations is an important channel through which incentives worked), and maps most closely to 
the types of performance-based aid to central or regional governments being considered at the 
more macro level. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the design of the 
program, the experimental design, and the econometric approach. Section 3 presents the main 
results of the impact of the incentives on the 12 targeted indicators. Section 4 examines the 
potential adverse effects of incentives, and Section 5 examines the mechanisms through which 
the incentives may have acted. Section 6 discusses the cost-effectiveness calculation, and Section 
7 concludes. 7 
2.  Program and experimental design 
2.1. The Generasi Program 
To the best of our knowledge, the Generasi program is the first health and education 
program worldwide that combines community block grants with explicit performance bonuses 
for communities. The Generasi program, known formally as Program National Pemberdayaan 
Masyarakat – Generasi Sehat dan Cerdas (National Community Empowerment Program – 
Healthy and Smart Generation) began in mid-2007 in 129 subdistricts in rural areas of five 
Indonesian provinces: West Java, East Java, North Sulawesi, Gorontalo, and Nusa Tenggara 
Timur. In the program’s second year, which began in mid-2008, the program expanded to cover 
a total of 2,120 villages in a total of 176 subdistricts, with a total annual budget of US$44 
million, funded through a mix of Indonesian government budget appropriations, World Bank, 
and donor country support.  
The Generasi program is oriented around the 12 indicators of maternal and child health 
behavior and educational behavior shown in column (1) of Table 1. These indicators were 
chosen by the government of Indonesia to be as similar as possible to the conditions for a 
conditional cash transfer being piloted at the same time as Generasi (but in different locations), 
and, as such, they are in the same spirit as the conditions used by CCTs in other countries, such 
as Mexico’s Progresa (Gertler 2004; Schultz 2004; Levy 2006). These 12 indicators represent 
health and educational behaviors that are within the direct control of villagers—such as, the 
number of children who receive immunizations, prenatal and postnatal care, and the number of 
children enrolled and attending school—rather than long-term outcomes, such as test scores or 
infant mortality. They also correspond to the Indonesian government’s standard of service for 
maternal and child health and to the Indonesian government’s stated goal of universal primary 
and junior secondary education. 8 
In Generasi, each year all participating villages receive a block grant to improve maternal 
health, child health, and education. Block grants are usable for any purpose that the village can 
claim might help address one of the 12 indicators shown in Table 1, including, but not limited to, 
hiring extra midwives for the village, subsidizing the costs of prenatal and postnatal care, 
providing supplementary feeding, hiring extra teachers, opening a branch school in the village, 
providing scholarships, providing school uniforms, providing transportation funds for health care 
or school attendance, improving health or school buildings, or even building a road or path 
through the forest to improve access to health and educational facilities. The block grants 
averaged US$8,500 in the first year of the program and US$13,500 in the second year of the 
program, or about US$2.70 – US$4.30 per person living in Generasi villages in the target age 
ranges.  
To decide on the allocation of the funds, trained facilitators help each village elect an 11-
member village management team, as well as select local facilitators and volunteers. Through 
social mapping and in-depth discussion groups, villagers identify problems and bottlenecks in 
reaching the 12 indicators. Inter-village meetings and consultation workshops with local health 
and education service providers allow community leaders to obtain information, technical 
assistance, and support from the local health and education offices as well as to coordinate the 
use of Generasi funds for multi-village projects. Following these discussions, the 11-member 
management team makes the final Generasi budget allocation. 
2.2. Performance Incentives 
In Generasi, the size of a village’s block grant depends in part on its performance on the 
12 targeted indicators in the previous year. The purpose of the performance bonus is to increase 
the village’s effort at achieving the targeted indicators (Holmstrom 1979), both by encouraging a 9 
more effective allocation of Generasi funds and by stimulating village outreach efforts to 
encourage mothers and children to obtain appropriate health care and increase educational 
enrollment and attendance. The performance bonus is structured as relative competition between 
villages within the same subdistrict (kecamatan). By making the performance bonuses relative to 
other villages in the subdistrict, the government sought to minimize the impact of unobserved 
differences in the capabilities of different areas on the performance bonuses (Lazear and Rosen 
1981; Mookherjee 1984; Gibbons and Murphy 1990) and to avoid funds flowing towards richer 
areas We discuss the impact of the relative bonus scheme on allocations, and compare it to a 
counter-factual with absolute performance bonuses, in Section 4.3 below. 
The rule for allocating Generasi funds is as follows. The size of the overall Generasi 
allocation for the entire subdistrict is fixed by the subdistrict’s population and province. Within a 
subdistrict, in year 1 of the program funds are divided among villages in proportion to the 
number of target beneficiaries in each village (i.e., the number of children of varying ages and 
the expected number of pregnant women). Starting in year 2 of the program, 80 percent of the 
subdistrict’s funds continue to be divided among villages in proportion to the number of target 
beneficiaries; the remaining 20 percent of the subdistrict’s funds form a performance bonus pool, 
to be divided among villages based on their performance on the 12 Generasi indicators. The 
performance bonus pool is allocated to villages in proportion to a weighted sum of each village’s 
performance above a predicted minimum achievement level, i.e.  
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In this formula, yvi represents village v’s performance on indicator i, wi represents the weight for 
indicator i, mvi represents the predicted minimum achievement level for village v and indicator i, 10 
and Pv is the total number of bonus “points” earned by village v.  The minimums for each 
indicator (mvi ) were set to be equal to 70 percent of the predicted level, so that virtually all 
villages would be “in the money” and face linear incentives on the margin on all 12 indicators. 
The weights for each indicator, wi, were set by the government to be approximately proportional 
to the marginal cost of having an additional individual complete that indicator. The weights, 
along with the performance metric for each indicator i, are shown in Table 1. Simple 
spreadsheets were created to help villagers understand the formulas. Additional details can be 
found in Appendix 1.  
To monitor achievement of the health indicators, facilitators collect data from health 
providers and community health workers on the amount of each type of service provided. School 
enrollment and attendance data are obtained from the official school register.
1  
As discussed above, two versions of the Generasi program were implemented to separate 
the impact of the performance incentives per se from the overall impact of having additional 
financial resources available for health and education: the program with performance bonuses 
described above (referred to as “incentivized”), and an identical program without performance 
bonuses (referred to as “non-incentivized”). The non-incentivized version is identical to the 
incentivized version except that in the non-incentivized version, there is no performance bonus 
pool; instead, in all years, 100 percent of funds are divided among villages in proportion to the 
number of target beneficiaries in each village. In all other respects, the two versions of the 
program are identical: the total amount of funds allocated to each subdistrict is the same in both 
                                                 
1   Obtaining attendance data from the official school register is not a perfect measure, since it is possible that 
teachers could manipulate student attendance records to ensure they cross the 85 percent threshold (Linden and 
Shastry forthcoming). While more objective measures of monitoring attendance were considered, such as taking 
daily photos of students (as in Duflo, Hanna, and Ryan forthcoming) or installing fingerprint readers in all schools 
(Express India News Service 2008), Generasi decided not to adopt these more objective measures due to their cost 
and logistical complexity. We test for this type of differential manipulation in Section 4.2 below.  11 
versions, the same socialization materials and indicators are used, the same procedures are used 
to pick village budget allocations, and the same monitoring tools and scoring system are used. 
Even the annual point score of villages Pv is also calculated in non-incentivized areas; the only 
difference is that in non-incentivized villages the points are used simply as an end-of-year 
monitoring and evaluation tool, and have no relationship to the allocation of funds. Within a 
given subdistrict, all villages participate in the same version of the program (i.e., either all 
villages received incentivized Generasi or all villages received non-incentivized Generasi). 
2.3. Experimental design and data 
Generasi locations were selected by lottery to form a randomized, controlled field 
experiment. The Generasi randomization was conducted at the subdistrict (kecamatan) level, so 
that all villages within the subdistrict either received the same version of Generasi (either all 
incentivized or all non-incentivized) or were in the control group.
2 A total of 264 eligible 
subdistricts were randomized into either one of the two treatment groups or the control group. 
Details on how the 264 subdistricts were selected and the randomization can be found in 
Appendix 2.  
The program was phased in over two years, with 127 treatment subdistricts in year 1 and 
174 treatment subdistricts in year 2. In year 1, for logistical reasons, the government prioritized 
those subdistricts who had previously received the regular PNPM village infrastructure program 
(denoted group P) to receive the program first. Since we observe group P status in treatment as 
well as control groups, we control for group P status (interacted with time fixed effects) in the 
experimental analysis below to ensure we use only the variation induced by the lottery. By year 
                                                 
2 Randomizing at the subdistrict level is important since many health and education services, such as community 
health centers (Puskesmas) and junior secondary schools, provide services to multiple villages within a subdistricts. 
Randomizing at the subdistrict level ensures that we capture the total net effect of the program, since any within-
subdistrict spillovers would also be captured in other treatment villages. 12 
two of the program (2008) 96% of eligible subdistricts – 174 out of the 181 eligible subdistricts 
randomized to receive Generasi – were receiving the program. The remaining 7 eligible districts 
received the regular PNPM village infrastructure program instead of Generasi.
3 Conditional on 
receiving the program, compliance with the incentivized or non-incentivized randomization was 
100%. 
The phase-in and final allocation of Generasi is shown in Table 2. In all analysis, we 
report intent-to-treat estimates based on the computer randomization we conducted among the 
264 eligible subdistricts and the prioritization rule specified by the government. A balance check 
that shows that the randomization is balanced against baseline levels of covariates is discussed in 
Appendix 3 and shown in Appendix Table 1. 
The main data we examine is a set of three waves of surveys of households, village 
officials, health service providers, and school officials. Wave I, the baseline round, was 
conducted from June to August 2007 prior to Generasi implementation.
4 Wave II, the first 
follow-up survey round, was conducted from October to December 2008, about 18 months after 
the program began. Wave III, a longer-term follow-up survey round, was conducted from 
October 2009 to January 2010, about 30 months after the program began. Approximately 12,000 
households were interviewed in each survey wave, as well as more than 8,000 village officials 
and health and education providers. These surveys were designed by the authors and were 
conducted by the Center for Population and Policy Studies (CPPS) of the University of Gadjah 
Mada, Yogyakarta, Indonesia. This survey data is unrelated to the data collected by the program 
                                                 
3 We do not know why these 7 districts received regular PNPM rather than Generasi. We therefore include them in 
the treatment group as if they had received the program, and interpret the resulting estimates as intent-to-treat 
estimates. Appendix Table 2 shows that controlling for whether a subdistrict received traditional PNPM does not 
affect the results. 
4 Note that in a very small number of villages, the Generasi program field preparations may have begun prior to the 
baseline survey being completed. We have verified that the main results are unaltered if we do not use the baseline 
data in these villages. See Appendix Table 2 column 10.  13 
for the purposes of calculating performance bonuses, and was not explicitly linked to the 
Generasi program in any way. Additional details about these data can be found in Appendix 4.  
2.4. Estimation 
Since the Generasi program was designed as a randomized experiment, the analysis is 
econometrically straightforward: we compare outcomes in those subdistricts randomized to be 
treatments with those subdistricts randomized to be control areas, controlling for the level of the 
outcome at baseline.  
In implementing our analysis, we restrict attention to the 264 “eligible” subdistricts, as 
above, and use the randomization results combined with the government’s prioritization rule to 
construct our treatment variables. Specifically, analyzing Wave II data (corresponding to the first 
treatment year), we define the GENERASI variable to be a dummy that takes value 1 if the 
subdistrict was randomized to receive GENERASI and either a) it was in the priority area (group 
P) or b) was in the non-priority area and selected in the additional lottery to receive the program 
in 2007. In analyzing Wave III data, we define the GENERASI  variable to be a dummy that 
takes value 1 if the subdistrict was randomized to receive Generasi. We define the 
GENERASIINCENTIVES variable to be a dummy that takes value 1 if the GENERASI variable 
is 1 and if the subdistrict was randomized to be in the incentivized version of the program. 
GENERASIINCENTIVES thus captures the additional effect of the incentives above and beyond 
the main effect of having the program, and is the key variable of interest in the paper. Note that 
by defining the variables in this way, we are exploiting only the variation in program exposure 
due to the lottery. These variables capture the intent-to-treat effect of the program, and since the 
lottery results were very closely followed – they predict true program implementation in 99% of 14 
subdistricts in 2007 and 96% of subdistricts in 2008 – they will be very close to the true effect of 
the treatment on the treated (Imbens and Angrist 1994).  
We control controlling for the average level of the outcome variable in the subdistrict in 
the baseline survey. Since we also have individual-specific panel data for half our sample, we 
include the pre-period value for those who have it, as well as a dummy variable that corresponds 
to having non-missing pre-period values. Since households came from one of three different 
samples (those with a child under age 2, those with a child age 2–15 but not in the first group, 
and all others; see Appendix 4 for more information), we include dummies for those three 
sample types, interacted with whether a household came from a panel or non-panel village. 
Finally, since many of the indicators for children vary naturally as the child ages, for all child-
level variables we include age dummies.  
We thus estimate the following regressions:  
Wave II data: 
                                                                 
    1                                                                    
(1) 
Wave III data: 
                                                                 
    1                                                                    
(2) 
Wave II and III combined average effect: 
                                                                   
     1                                                                    
(3) 
where i is an individual respondent, p is a province, d is a district, s is a subdistrict, t is the 
survey wave (1 = baseline, 2 = interim survey, 3 = final survey), pdsit y is the outcome in Wave t, 
d α is a district fixed effect,  1 pdsi y is the baseline value for individual i (assuming that this is a 15 
panel household, and 0 if it is not a panel household),   g mis ypdsi sin 1 1  is a dummy for being a panel 
household,  1 ds y is the average baseline value for the subdistrict, SAMPLE are dummies for how 
the household was sampled interacted with being a panel or cross-section household, and  s p P α 
are province-specific dummies for being in the sample areas having had prior community-driven 
development experience through the KDP program. Standard errors are clustered at the 
subdistrict level. Note that in the final equation for computing the average effect over Wave II 
and Wave III, all control variables (e.g., district FE, sample controls, baseline values, etc) are be 
fully interacted with wave dummies (shown in the equation with coefficients indexed by t), to 
capture the fact that there may be differential trends in different parts of the country.  
The key coefficient of interest is β2, which estimates the difference between the 
incentivized and non-incentivized version of the program. We can also calculate the total impact 
of the incentivized version of the program (vis-à-vis pure controls) by adding the coefficients on 
GENERASIINCENTIVES and GENERASI. We also examine a wide variety of additional 
specifications as robustness tests; these specifications are discussed in more detail in Section 3. 
Since we have a large number of indicators, in order to calculate joint significance we 
will calculate average standardized effects for each family of indicators, following Kling, 
Liebman and Katz (2007). Specifically, for each indicator i, define σ
2
i to be the variance of i. We 
then estimate (1) for each indicator, but run the regressions jointly, clustering the standard errors 
by subdistrict to allow for arbitrary correlation among the errors across equations within 
subdistricts both between and across indicators. We then define the average standardized effect 
as  16 
 
  
    
 
(4) 
Note that all of the analysis presented here (regression specifications including control 
variables, outcome variables, and aggregate effects) follows an analysis plan that was finalized in 
April 2009 for the Wave II data (before we examined any of the Wave II data) and in January 
2010 (before we examined any of the Wave III data). This hypothesis document was registered 
with the Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab at MIT and is available on request.  
3.  Main results on targeted indicators 
3.1. Overall impact 
Table 3 presents the results on the 12 targeted indicators. Each row in Table 3 presents 
three separate regressions. Column (1) shows the baseline mean of the variable. Columns (2) – 
(4) show the regression with the Wave II survey results (after one year of program 
implementation) estimated using equation (1); columns (5) – (7) show the regression with the 
Wave III survey results estimated using equation (2); columns (8) – (10) show the regression that 
average across both survey waves estimated using equation (3). For each specification, we show 
the total Generasi treatment effect in incentive areas (the sum of the coefficients on GENERASI 
and GENERASIINCENTIVES), the total Generasi treatment effect in non-incentive areas (the 
coefficient on GENERASI), and the additional treatment effect due to the incentives (the 
coefficient on GENERASIINCENTIVES). The first 12 rows present each of the main 12 
indicators one by one. The next three rows present average standardized effects overall, for the 8 
health indicators and for the 4 education indicators. The final three rows present our estimate of 
the total “bonus points,” where the 12 indicators are weighted using the weights in Table 1 and 
an estimate for the number of affected households (using the same estimated number of 
households in both treatment groups). All data is from the household surveys. 17 
Focusing first on the average standardized effects, column (10) shows that on average 
over the two years of the program, the 8 targeted maternal and child indicators (e.g., prenatal 
visits, delivery by trained midwives, immunizations, regular weight checks) were an average of 
0.03 standard deviations higher in incentivized areas than in non-incentivized areas. The only 
one of the 12 indicators that is individually significant is prenatal visits, which were 5% higher in 
incentivized areas than non-incentivized areas. The effects appear somewhat larger in Wave II – 
column (4) shows that the average standardized effect of the incentives on health is 0.04 standard 
deviations, whereas column (7) shows that they were a (statistically insignificant) 0.026 standard 
deviations in Wave III. The comparison to pure controls suggest that the change over time is due 
to increases in effectiveness in the non-incentivized areas, rather than declining effectiveness of 
the incentivized areas, though these differences are not statistically significant.
5 In Wave II 
prenatal visits were 8% higher in incentivized areas than in non-incentivized areas; weight 
checks were 4% higher; and, most notably, malnutrition (defined as having weight-for-age more 
than 2 standard deviations below World Health Organization standards) was 15% lower in 
incentivized areas.  
No effects of the incentives were seen in education in either wave. In both incentivized 
and non-incentivized areas, age 13-15 participation and gross attendance fell relative to controls 
in Wave II, and age 7-12 participation increased in Wave III. The average standardized effects 
for education for both incentivized and non-incentivized areas decrease in Wave II and increase 
                                                 
5 To test whether the differences between waves are statistically significant, we conducted additional analysis where 
we restricted the sample to those subdistricts that were randomized to be treatment in both waves or control in both 
waves, so that differences over time could be separated from changing composition of participating districts over 
time. We then tested whether the impact of incentives in Wave II (after 1 year) was different from the impact in 
Wave III (after 2 years). Appendix Table 5 presents the results, which shows that none of the differences in average 
standardized effects for health (either separately by treatment or the additional effects of the incentives) are 
statistically significantly different between waves. 18 
in Wave III.
6 Overall, this was a period where enrollments were increasing dramatically 
throughout Indonesia (including in our control areas). 
It is worth noting that a substantial share of the overall effect of the Generasi program can 
be attributed to the performance incentives. In Wave II, the incentivized version of the program 
improved the 12 indicators by an average of 0.053 standard deviations compared to pure control 
(column 2), while the non-incentivized version improved the 12 indicators by only 0.012 
standard deviations (column 3, statistically insignificant). This implies that 77% of the total 
impact of the program can be attributed to the incentives. In Wave III, even though the effect of 
the incentives is statistically insignificant, the point estimates suggest that 50% of the total 
impact of the program can be attributed to the incentives. Thus, when the incentive effect is 
scaled by the overall impact of the program, the incentives seem to have had a substantial effect.  
An alternative approach to weighting the various individual effects is to use the weights 
used by the program in calculating bonus payments. This approach has the advantage that it 
weights each indicator by the weight assigned to it by the government. For each indicator, we use 
the weights in Table 1, multiplied by the number of potential beneficiaries of each indicator 
(garnered from population data in different age ranges from the program’s internal management 
system, and using the same numbers for both treatment groups), and aggregate to determine the 
total number of “points” created by each version of the program. The results, shown at the 
bottom of table, show a similar story to the average standardized effects. In Wave II, 93 percent 
of the program’s impact on health (in terms of points) can be attributed to the incentives; in 
                                                 
6 In particular, if we pool incentive and non-incentivized treatments, the change in 7-12 participation and the 
education average standardized effects become statistically significant. We also find a statistically significant 4 
percentage point (6 percent) improvement in the percentage of people age 13-15 enrolled in middle school. These 
results are in Olken, Onishi and Wong (2011). 19 
Wave III, 30 percent of the program’s impact on health (in terms of points) can be attributed to 
the incentives, though the Wave III difference is not statistically significant.  
Although we pre-specified equations (1) – (3) as the main regression specifications of 
interest, we have also considered the robustness of these results to a wide range of alternative 
specifications. Appendix Table 2 reports the coefficient on the additional effect of the incentives 
– the equivalent of columns (4), (7), and (10) – for specifications where we control for the 
baseline level of all 12 indicators instead of just the indicator in question, control only for 
subdistrict averages at baseline rather than also using individual baseline controls, include no 
controls whatsoever, estimate the regression in first-differences rather than including the baseline 
level as a control, and run the entire regression aggregated to the subdistrict level, rather than 
using individual level data. The results are very consistent with the main specification in Table 3.  
3.2. Heterogeneity in impact 
We test whether the incentives had a larger impact in areas where the baseline level was 
lower. The idea is that the marginal cost of improving achievement is higher if the baseline level 
is higher, e.g., moving from 98% to 98% enrollment rates is harder than from moving from 80% 
to 81%.
7 To examine this explicitly, we re-estimate equations (1) – (3), interacting the 
GENERASI and GENERASIINCENTIVES variables with the mean value of the indicator in the 
subdistrict at baseline. The results are shown in Table 4. A negative coefficient on the interaction 
implies that the program was more effective in areas with worse baseline levels. For ease of 
interpretation, we also present the implied impacts calculated at the 10
th percentile of the baseline 
distribution.  
                                                 
7 Note that this is the main dimension of heterogeneity we specified in the pre-specified analysis plan.  20 
The results confirm that the incentives were more effective in areas with lower baseline 
levels of service delivery – the standardized interaction term of GENERASIINCENTIVES * 
BASELINE_VALUE in columns (3), (7), and (11) are negative and, in both Wave II and overall, 
statistically significant. To interpret the magnitude of the heterogeneity, note that, in Wave II, the 
incentives added 0.074 standard deviations to the health indicators at the 10
th percentile of the 
baseline distribution. In Wave III, it was 0.06 standard deviations (not statistically significant), 
and across the two waves, it was 0.066 standard deviations. These effects are about double the 
average effect of the program shown in Table 3, and suggest that, indeed, incentives were more 
effective in areas with lower baseline levels.  
Consistent with the results in Table 4, we find that the incentives were more effective in 
the poorer, off-Java locations: on average across all waves, the total standardized effect for 
health was 0.11 standard deviations higher in incentivized areas than non-incentivized areas in 
NTT province relative to Java, and 0.14 standard deviations higher in incentivized areas than 
non-incentivized areas in Sulawesi relative to Java (see Appendix Table 3). This is not surprising 
given the lower levels of baseline service delivery in these areas: malnutrition for under 3 year 
olds (more than 2 standard deviations below the age adjusted weight as defined by the WHO) is 
12.6 percent in Java, but 24.7 percent in NTT and 23.4 percent in Sulawesi; similarly, 76.4 
percent of births in our Java areas are attended by a trained medical professional (midwife or 
doctor), compared with only 42.7 percent are attended by a trained professional in NTT and only 
55.9 percent in Sulawesi. These results confirm the idea that the program was substantially more 
effective in areas with lower levels of baseline service provision. 21 
4.  Potential pitfalls of incentives 
The previous section shows that the performance incentives substantially increased the 
effectiveness of the program. In this section, we test for three types of negative consequences 
from the incentives: multi-tasking problems (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991), where 
performance incentives encourage substitution away from non-incentivized outcomes; 
manipulation of performance records; and reallocation of funds towards wealthier areas. 
4.1. Spillovers on non-targeted indicators 
Whether the incentives would increase or decrease performance on non-targeted 
indicators depends on the nature of the health and education production functions. For example, 
if there is a large fixed cost of getting a midwife to show up in a village, but a small marginal 
cost of seeing additional patients once she is there, one might expect that other midwife-provided 
health services would increase. Alternatively, if the major cost is her time, she may substitute 
towards the types of service incentivized by Generasi and away from things outside the incentive 
scheme, such as family planning, or might spend less time with each patient.  
We test for spillover effects on 3 health domains: utilization of non-incentivized health 
services (e.g., adult health, prenatal visits beyond the number of visits that qualify for 
incentives), quality of health service provided by midwives (as measured by the share of the total 
required services they provide in a typical meeting), and maternal knowledge and practices. In 
constructing these indicators, we erred on the side of including more rather than fewer indicators 
(once again, all indicators were pre-specified in the analysis plan prior to examining the data). 
We also examine potential impacts on family composition decisions (for example, does better 
maternal care induce people to have more children or migrate into the area). On the education 
side, we examine the impact on high school enrollment, hours spent in school, enrollment in 22 
informal education (so-called Paket A, B, and C, which are the at-home equivalents of primary, 
junior secondary, and senior secondary schools), distance to school, and child labor.  
Table 5 reports the average standardized effects for each of these domains; the detailed 
indicator-by-indicator results can be found in Appendix Table 4. In general, we find no 
differential negative spillover impacts of the performance incentives on any of these indicators, 
and if anything, find some slight evidence of positive spillovers. For example, we find that the 
performance incentives led to positive effects on reductions in child labor (.12 hours per child for 
age 7-15; 0.08 standard deviations in Wave II and 0.03 standard deviations overall). This 
suggests that negative spillovers on non-targeted indicators do not seem to be a substantial 
concern with the performance incentives in this context. 
4.2. Manipulation of performance records 
A second potential downside of performance incentives is that communities or providers 
may manipulate records to inflate scores. For example, Linden and Shastry (forthcoming) show 
that teachers in India inflate student attendance records to allow them to receive subsidized grain. 
Manipulation of recordkeeping can have substantial efficiency costs: for example, children could 
fail to get immunized properly if their immunization records were falsified.  
We can check for two types of falsification of recordkeeping. First, for immunizations 
and school attendance, we can check for falsification of actual underlying records by comparing 
the official records to an independent measure observed directly by our survey team. Second, we 
can check for general manipulation of the administrative data used to calculate the incentives by 
checking whether the administrative data is systematically higher or lower than the 
corresponding estimates using the household survey data.  23 
For the first approach – checking underlying records against direct observation by the 
survey team – we use two measures that we can verify directly. The BCG vaccine leaves a 
distinctive scar on the arm, so we can compare a child’s records on whether the BCG vaccine 
was administered to the presence of the BCG scar on the arm as measured by our surveyors (see 
Banerjee et al. 2008). Second, we compare attendance from random spot-checks of classrooms 
with attendance records from the same classroom on a specific day 1-2 months previously. 
Although the dates compared are not the identical (we could not obtain reliable records on the 
date of our survey, since the presence of our surveyors might affect the records), the difference 
between them should capture, on average, the markup in attendance. 
The results are shown in Table 6. Panel A explores the differences between BCG scars 
and record keeping.
8 On average, 75 percent of children have the scar; 60% of children have a 
record of receiving the vaccine, and 85 percent of children either have a record of receiving the 
vaccine or have a parent who reports the child received a vaccine. We defined a false “yes” if the 
child is recorded/declared as having had the vaccine but has no scar, and likewise for a false 
“no.” We find no statistically significant differences in false reports of the BCG scar based on 
the performance incentives, though the point estimates suggest the possibility of slight inflation 
in Wave II. 
Panel B explores differences in attendance rates. On average, attendance is overstated: 88 
percent of children were recorded as present by our random visits, whereas 95 percent were 
recorded present in the official attendance records. The discrepancy is unchanged by the 
performance incentives. In fact, recorded attendance appears lower in the incentive treatment 
                                                 
8 Note that in if the child did not have a record card, we asked the mother if the child was immunized. The 
“declared” vaccinated variable is 1 if either the record book or the mother report that the child was vaccinated. 24 
while actual attendance is unchanged, which suggests perhaps that the incentives led to better 
record keeping. 
Panel C of Table 6 uses a different approach, and examines manipulation of the program 
scores used to calculate incentive payments. For each of the 12 indicators in the household 
survey, we calculate the difference between the between average level of performance on that 
indicator in the respondent’s village according to the administrator and the corresponding values 
from the household survey.
9 We then regress the difference between the administrative and 
household data on a dummy for being in the incentivized version of the program. The average 
standardized effects are presented in Panel C of Table 6; the indicator-by-indicator results are 
available Appendix Table 8. Since there is no administrative data for control groups, the results 
show only the differences between the incentivized and non-incentivized groups. The results in 
Table 6 show that, for both Wave II and the pooled results, the difference between the 
administrative data and household survey is lower in the incentive than non-incentivized 
villages. This is the opposite of what one would expect if the incentives led villages to 
systematically inflate scores in the incentivized areas to increase their performance bonuses. 
Combined, these two pieces of evidence suggest that manipulation of recordkeeping is not a 
major problem of the performance incentives in this context. The fact that the performance 
bonuses were relative to other villages in the same subdistrict, and that those villages were 
allowed (indeed, encouraged) to regularly audit performance indicators in neighboring villages 
may have minimized the problems of over-reporting in this context. 
                                                 
9 For each indicator, the administrative data contains the total number of achievements per year. We divide by the 
number of people eligible to achieve the indicator (e.g., number of children age 13-15) to determine the average rate 
of achievement, which is comparable to what we observe in the household survey. 25 
4.3. Allocation of bonus money to wealthier areas 
A third potential pitfall of incentive schemes in an aid context is that they can result in a 
transfer of funds towards areas that need aid less: poorer or more remote areas, for example,  
might have lower performance levels, yet might actually have the highest marginal return from 
funds. The incentives in Generasi attempted to mitigate this concern though relative incentives. 
Specifically, the performance pool was fixed for each subdistrict, and villages within a given 
subdistrict were competing only against one another for bonus funds, rather than against much 
wealthier or better performing areas in other parts of the country. This relative incentive system 
meant that unobserved, subdistrict specific common shocks would cancel out, and it 
mechanically prevents the performance bonus from resulting in funds migrating from poorer 
subdistricts to wealthier subdistricts.
10 Nevertheless, if most of the differences in productivity 
were within subdistricts, not between subdistricts, the same problem could still occur. 
To explore whether relative performance measurement prevented funds from flowing to 
richer areas, in Table 7, in Panel A we regress the total amount of bonus funds each village 
received on village average per-capita consumption (measured in the household survey), village 
remoteness (measured in km from the district capital), and village poverty (measured as the share 
of households classified as poor by the eligibility criteria set by the national family planning 
board). In Panel B, we then repeat the same regressions for a counterfactual calculation for 
incentives without the relative performance component. Specifically, in the counterfactual we 
allocate bonus payments proportional to bonus points relative to all villages in the program, 
rather than relative only to other villages in the same subdistrict.  
                                                 
10 Minimum performance levels (mvi) were also adjusted based on coarse measures of access (distance to nearest 
midwife and distance to nearest junior secondary school). See Appendix 1. 26 
The results show that, in the actual allocation shown in Panel A, villages that were more 
remote (further from the district capital) received more bonus funds. The allocation of bonus 
funds was unrelated to average village consumption or to village poverty levels. By contrast, in 
the counterfactual calculation shown in Panel B where incentives were based just on points 
earned, rather than points earned relative to other villages in the same subdistrict, poor villages 
received substantially less, and more remote villages no longer received more. The calculation 
thus shows that the relative performance scheme was successful in preventing funds from 
migrating from poorer villages to richer villages: the counterfactual shows that had the program 
not awarded incentives relative to other villages in the same subdistrict, richer villages would 
have ended up receiving more bonus funds. 
In sum, the results in this section document that there were little negative effects of 
incentives: we found no evidence of multitasking problems; we found no evidence of 
manipulation of records, and we found that the relative incentive scheme successfully prevented 
the incentives from resulting in funds flowing to richer areas. 
5.  Mechanisms 
The results thus far showed that the incentives substantially improved the targeted health 
indicators with little obvious downside. In this section we explore three potential mechanisms 
through which the incentives may have had an impact: by inducing a change in the allocation of 
funds, by changing provider or community effort, and by changing the targeting of funds and 
benefits. 27 
5.1. Allocation of funds 
Table 8 examines whether the incentives affected how the Generasi communities chose to 
allocate the block grants. Each row in Panels A and B shows the share of the village’s block 
grant spent on the item. 
The most notable finding that emerges is that the incentives led to a shift away from 
education supplies – uniforms, books, and other school supplies – and towards health 
expenditures. In particular, spending on education supplies is about 4 percentage points (15 
percent) lower in incentivized villages, and health spending is about 3 percentage points (7 
percent) higher. One interpretation is that these types of education supplies are essentially a 
transfer – when distributed, they tend to be distributed quite broadly to the entire population, the 
vast majority of whose children are already in school, and therefore are likely to have relatively 
little impact on school attendance and enrollment. As shown in Table 3 above, the performance 
incentives improved health outcomes with no detrimental effect on education, so combined this 
suggests that the performance incentives may have led communities to reallocate funds away 
from potentially politically popular but ineffective education spending towards more effective 
health spending. 
We also tested two other hypotheses that do not seem borne out in the data. First, we 
expected that, since performance incentives effectively increase the discount rate (since one 
places higher value on a return in the current year since it will affect bonuses), we would expect 
a shift away from durable investments – if anything, the opposite appears to have occurred, with 
spending on health durables increasing by about 1.7 percentage points overall (18 percent). 
Second, we expected that performance incentives would lead to a decrease in “capture” of the 28 
funds to expenses benefitting providers (e.g., uniforms for health volunteers), but we see no 
impact on this dimension. 
The evidence thus far was on how the money was spent. Table 9 shows the other side of 
the equation, namely, what households received from the block grants, using data from the 
household survey. Both incentive and non-incentive versions show substantial increases in 
virtually all items, confirming that the block grant did indeed result in noticeable transfers of 
many types to households.  
With respect to the incentives, there are two notable results. First, households were no 
less likely to receive a uniform or school supplies in the incentive treatments than in the non-
incentive treatments – in fact, if anything the point estimates suggest they were 1.0-2.7 
percentage points (12-32 percent) more likely to receive a uniform in the groups with 
performance incentives and 1.0-1.7 percentage points (18-32 percent) more likely to receive 
other school supplies in the groups with performance incentives. Moreover, the self-reported 
Rupiah value of the uniform received is identical in both treatments. This suggests that the 
change in budget allocations away from uniforms and school supplies documented in Table 8 
likely came from increased efficiency in procuring the uniforms rather than a reduction in the 
quality or quantity of uniforms. Likewise, there was also a substantial increase in scholarships (1 
percentage point, or about 125 percent) and transport subsidies (0.6 percentage points, about 110 
percent). Thus, on average more children received education subsidies, even though more money 
was being spent on health. Combined with the fact that the health outcomes improved and 
education did not suffer, the evidence here suggests that the performance incentives improved 
the efficiency of the Generasi funds. 29 
5.2. Effort 
A second dimension we examine is effort – both on the part of workers and on the part of 
communities. Table 10 begins by examining effort of midwives, who are the primary health 
workers at the village level, teachers, and subdistrict level health center workers. The main 
impact is an increase in labor on the part of midwives. On average, midwives spent 1.7 hours (6 
percent) more working over the 3 days prior to the survey in incentive areas than in non-
incentive areas. There was no impact on teacher attendance or provider attendance at health care 
centers. Given that midwives are the main providers of maternal and child health services, the 
increase in midwife effort is consistent with the increase in these services we observed above.  
Virtually all of the midwives in our area have a mix of both public and private practice, 
but they vary in whether their government practice is as a full-fledged, tenured civil servant 
(PNS) or is instead on a temporary or contract basis. When we interact the variables in Table 10 
with a dummy for whether the midwife is a tenured civil servant, we find that the Generasi 
incentive treatment led to a greater increase in private practice hours provided by tenured civil 
servant midwives (See Appendix Table 7), with no change in their public hours. This suggests 
that Generasi was able to leverage the fee-for-service component of midwives’ lives to increase 
their service provision. Interestingly, the monetary compensation (e.g. value of subsidies per 
patient) Generasi provided to midwives did not differ between the incentivized and non-
incentivized treatments (results not reported in table), so it was not the financial incentives alone 
that resulted in the difference. More likely, it was the combination of other, non-financial 
incentives to midwives (e.g., effort from the community to bring people to health posts), 
combined with the fact that midwives were indeed paid for additional services they provided, 
that resulted in the midwives’ increase in effort. 30 
Table 11 examines the effort of communities. We examine three types of community 
effort: holding more posyandus, the monthly village health meetings where most maternal and 
child health care is providers; community effort at outreach, such as door-to-door “sweepings” to 
get more kids into the posyandu net and school committee meetings with parents, and 
community effort at monitoring service providers, such as school committee membership and 
meetings with teachers. We find no evidence that the performance incentives had an impact on 
any of these margins, although the Generasi program as a whole increased community 
participation at monthly community health outreach activities (posyandu) where many maternal 
and child services are provided.  
5.3. Targeting  
A third mechanism through which incentives could matter is by encouraging 
communities to target resources to those individuals who are the most elastic – i.e., those 
individuals for whom a given dollar is most likely to influence their behavior. While we can’t 
estimate each household’s individual elasticity directly, we can examine whether incentivized 
communities targeted differently based on the household’s per-capita consumption. The idea is 
that poorer households’ behavior may be more elastic with respect to subsidies than richer 
households, who can afford the targeted services with or without subsidies. Incentives could 
therefore encourage  e communities to targeted benefits to poorer households and resist the 
pressure from interest groups within the village to distribute benefits more evenly.
11 
The results in Table 12 show how the incentives affect how Generasi communities 
targeted the direct benefits they distribute. For each of the three specifications (Wave II, Wave 
                                                 
11 Of course, this prediction is theoretically ambiguous – one might also imagine that very poor households cannot 
afford services with very large subsidizes, so incentives would encourage targeting of middle-income households 
who are closest to the margin.  31 
III, and Pooled), we re-estimate equations (1) – (3), allowing for subdistrict fixed effects, and 
interact the GENREASI variables with a dummy for the household being in the top 3 quintiles of 
the income distribution in the baseline survey. The subdistrict fixed effects mean that this is 
controlling for the overall level of the outcome variable in the subdistrict, and thus picks up 
changes in the targeting of the outcomes among the rich and poor only. 
Table 12 shows estimated effects from the regression. We first present the difference 
between the top 3 quintiles and the bottom 2 quintiles for incentivized Generasi areas. A negative 
coefficient indicates that the poor received relatively more than the rich in Generasi areas relative 
to controls. The second column presents the difference between the top 3 quintiles and the 
bottom 2 quintiles for non-incentivized Generasi areas. The third column presents the difference 
between the first two columns. A negative coefficient in the third column indicates that the 
incentivized version of the program had more pro-poor targeting than the non-incentivized 
version. Panel A shows the average standardized effects for targeting of direct benefits (i.e. the 
subsidies and transfers examined in Table 9), and Panel B shows the average standardized effects 
for targeting of improvements in actual outcomes (i.e., the main indicators examined in Table 3). 
Detailed indicator-by-indicator results are shown in Appendix Tables 9 and 10. The results in 
Panel A show suggest there is somewhat more targeting of direct benefits to the poor in the 
incentivized version of the program, but the difference between the incentivized versions and 
non-incentivized versions is not statistically significant overall. Likewise in Panel B there is mild 
suggestive evidence that incentives improve targeting of improvements in outcomes, but this is 
generally not statistically significant. 
In sum, the results in this section point to two main channels through which incentives 
mattered. Incentives led to a more efficient allocation of block grants, reducing expenditure on 32 
uniforms and other school supplies while not affecting household’s receipt of these items, and 
using the savings to increase expenditures on health. And, incentives led to an increase in 
midwife hours worked, particularly from tenured, civil servant midwives working in their private 
capacity. 
6.  Cost-effectiveness 
It is difficult to interpret the magnitudes given above without some notion of costs. 
Conditional on implementing the Generasi program, adding the performance incentives was 
essentially free – the same monitoring of indicators was done in both the incentivized and non-
incentivized versions of the program, no additional personnel were required to do monitoring 
(the program would have needed facilitators regardless), and since the performance bonuses 
were relative within a subdistrict and the amount of money was fixed, there was no difference in 
the total size of block grants in incentivized and non-incentivized areas. Thus the cost 
effectiveness of the incentives themselves for this program is easy to analyze: they improved 
outcomes, added virtually no costs, and therefore is likely to be cost effective. 
The challenge in doing a cost-effectiveness calculation more formally is that there are 
many potential outcomes, and we do not necessarily know how to apportion the costs of the 
programs among the various outcomes. We therefore take the following approach: as in Section 
3, we calculate the total number of “points” the program created, using the weighting scheme 
agreed upon in advance and shown in Table 1 and the point estimates for the impact of the 
program from Table 3.
12 We divide the total cost of the program by the total number of points 
created to generate a “cost per point”, which can then be interpreted using the point values in 
                                                 
12 Note that the number of points shown in this section is approximately half the total number of points reported in 
Table 3. The reason is that Table 3 is calculated using the total number of beneficiaries in the program, whereas in 
this section since we are mapping it to points we use number of beneficiaries in the particular treatment group only, 
which is half of the total. 33 
Table 1. While naturally different weighting schemes could produce different answers, we use 
the points in the program since they presumably represent the government’s relative weightings 
of the different interventions, i.e. we use a set of relative prices that should roughly correspond to 
the relative weights the government places on the various indicators. 
To calculate the costs of the program, we divide the expenditures into transfers to 
households and real expenditures (i.e. real allocation of resources). For transfers, we assume that 
transfers are valued by recipients at cost, so the real social cost of transfers is the social 
deadweight loss of taxation to raise the funds for the transfers. For non-transfer costs (such as 
hiring a midwife), the social cost is the expenditure plus the deadweight loss of taxation. For the 
purposes of evaluating Generasi, we count school supplies, school fee subsidies, health care 
subsidies, and supplementary food as transfers, and all other expenditures as real expenditures. 
As shown in Table 10 above, about 75% of the block grant is spent on transfers by these 
definitions. We also include the cost of the facilitators who administer the program as real 
expenditures. We use the consensus estimate of the marginal cost of public funds of 0.3 (Ballard, 
Shoven, and Whalley 1985), though we note that there are not reliable estimates of this 
parameter for developing countries. We use the Wave III impact results (at the end of the 
program’s second year), when the program was at full scale, for this calculation. 
The estimates are presented in Table 13. The key results are shown in the first two 
columns of Panel A: Generasi with incentives had a real cost per point of about $8, and Generasi 
without incentives had a real cost per point of about $11. Since the estimates in Table 3 show 
that, for year 3, the difference in the total number of points between incentivized and non-
incentivized versions of the program is not significantly different, we should treat the difference 
between $8 and $11 as also not statistically significant. Panel B separately estimates the cost 34 
effectiveness for the health and education components of the program, allocating facilitation 
costs equally between the two portions of the program and allocating expenditures based on how 
communities actually allocated block grants. For health, this yields estimates of $7 per point for 
the incentivized version and $9 for the non-incentivized version. For education, this yields 
estimates of $13 per point for the incentivized version and $16 for the non-incentivized version.  
How do we interpret the $8 - $11 per point average cost effectiveness of the program? 
One approach is to back out what this implies to move a given indicator. Applying the weights 
from Table 1, for example, suggests that the cost of additional child weight check was $16 - $22, 
the cost of preventing one malnourished child was $384 - $528, the cost of getting one additional 
child fully covered with Vitamin A was $160 - $220, and the cost of enrolling one more child in 
primary school was $200 - $275. 
Are these numbers large or small? While that is ultimately a judgment question for the 
reader, we provide two benchmarks. First, the closest comparison is Indonesia’s conditional cash 
transfer program (PKH). The PKH program was conducted at the same time and evaluated using 
a randomized evaluation using the same survey instruments as Generasi, though it was conducted 
in somewhat different areas of the country (more urban and with better supply of services), and 
was targeted at the same set of indicators. We use the randomized evaluation results from Alatas 
(2011) of the PKH program, combined with the same weights in Table 1.
13 Alatas reports an 
estimated effect just for those households receiving PKH, as well as a “placement effect” on all 
poor households in the subdistricts regardless of whether they received PKH or not. We report 
                                                 
13 We calculate the number of households of different age ranges from the PKH survey data on all PKH respondents. 
For spillovers, we assume that there are 2 non-PKH households for every one PKH household. This is consistent 
with the data used in the PKH evaluation, which consisted of a survey of previous cash transfer recipients and is the 
population over which they estimate spillovers. If there are spillovers to other parts of the population , this may be 
an underestimate.  35 
cost-effectiveness numbers based on both calculations. The results suggest that, if one focuses 
only on the benefits enjoyed by PKH households, Generasi is more cost effective – with the $8 – 
$11 per point in Generasi comparing to about $22 per point for PKH. If one includes estimated 
spillover effects from PKH to non-recipient households in the same subdistricts, then the $8 - 
$11 per point for Generasi is comparable to the $11 per point estimate for PKH.
14 Thus, the 
Generasi program looks roughly comparable to an alternative program tried in Indonesia at the 
same time. 
An alternative benchmark is to look at international comparisons. For example, school-
based deworming in Kenya costs $3.50 per additional year of school attendance, and iron and 
deworming tablets in India cost $29 per additional year of school attendance. School meals in 
Kenya cost $35 per additional year of attendance, and school uniforms cost about $100 per 
additional year of attendance (JPAL 2011). By comparison, Generasi would cost between $125 - 
$400 per additional year schooling.
 15 By this metric, Generasi as a whole is substantially less 
cost-effective than these other interventions, although it is worth noting that Generasi affects 
enrollment rates, whereas the international comparisons affect attendance, and that there is 
already high baseline enrollment in Generasi areas, which makes the marginal cost higher. 
While these numbers suggest that Generasi, as a whole, may be more expensive than 
these other programs, the performance incentives themselves – at $0.62 per point, which 
translates into $16 per additional child enrolled in school and $30 per case of malnutrition 
avoided – compares favorably with all of the above interventions except deworming. The reason 
                                                 
14 It is also worth noting that neither calculation includes the benefits from redistribution.  
15 Note that these estimates are not strictly comparable to the estimates in Table 13, since they count all program 
expenditures at cost regardless of whether they were transfers or not, and do not include the deadweight loss of 
taxation. When we redo the Generasi cost-effectiveness in this way, we obtain a cost per point of around $12. 
See Appendix Table 11. 36 
the incentives themselves are cost effective is that in our case they are essentially free – the block 
grant was the same with and without incentives, and collecting the data used to validate the 
incentives was done in both the incentivized and non-incentivized versions of the program, so 
the only “costs” come from the fact that there were slightly more real expenditures and slightly 
fewer transfers in the incentivized version of the program. This suggests that while the Generasi 
program as a whole was not as cost effective as some other international comparators, adding 
incentives to existing programs may be a cost-effective way to improve performance.  
7.  Conclusion 
 
In sum, the evidence presented here suggests that properly designed, performance based 
incentives can be a useful addition to aid programs. In Indonesia, we found that adding a relative 
performance-based incentive to a community-based health and education program increased 
performance. This was particularly true in areas with the lowest levels of performance before the 
program began. Incentives worked through increasing the efficiency with which funds were 
spent and through increasing providers’ hours worked. Though the gains from incentives were 
relatively modest, we found little downside from the incentives – there was no evidence of 
multitasking problems, no evidence of manipulation of records, and no evidence that 
performance incentives led to funds systematically flowing to richer or otherwise more 
advantaged areas.  
The results have several implications for design of performance based aid schemes. First, 
the fact that an important channel through which incentives appeared to work was the 
reallocation of budgets suggest that one may not want to make the incentives too narrow – 
instead, to the extent the multitasking issue can be controlled (and it was not an issue here), it 
may be better to give broad incentives and let the recipients have sufficient power to shuffle 37 
resources to achieve them. Second, the results suggest that while performance based aid can be 
effective, care must be taken to ensure that it does not result in aid money flowing to richer areas 
which where it may have lower benefit. Indeed, we show that in this case, the fact that 
performance incentives were relative to a small set of close geographical neighbors, meant that 
performance bonus money did not accrue to richer areas, but it would have in the absence of this 
relative competition. Incorporating these types of features into performance based aid schemes 
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1.  Prenatal care visit  12  4  48 
2.  Iron tablets (30 pill packet)  7  3  21 
3.  Childbirth assisted by trained professional  100  1  100 
4.  Postnatal care visit  25  2  50 
5.  Immunizations   4  12  48 
6.  Monthly weight increases   4  12  48 
7.  Weight check  2  12  24 
8.  Vitamin A pill  10  2  20 
9.  Primary enrollment  25  1  25 
10.  Monthly primary attendance >= 85%  2  12  24 
11.  Middle school enrollment  50  1  50 
12.  Monthly middle school attendance >= 85%  5  12  60 
Notes: This table shows the 12 indicators used in the Generasi program, along with the weights assigned by the program in calculating bonus points 
 






Generasi  Control Total 
  P NP P NP P NP   
Total subdistricts in initial randomization  61  39  55  45  55  45  300 
Total  eligible  subdistricts    57 36 48 40 46 37 264 
Eligible and received Generasi  in:          
   2007  57 10 48 12  0  0 127 
   2008  57 33 48 36  0  0 174 
          
Notes: This table shows the randomization and actual program implementation. P indicates the subdistricts that were ex-ante prioritized to receive Generasi in 2007 should 
they be randomly selected for the program; after the priority areas were given the program, a second lottery was held to select which NP subdistricts randomly selected to 
receive the program should receive it starting in 2007. The randomization results are shown in the columns (Incentivized Generasi, Non-incentivized Generasi, and 
Control). Actual implementation status is shown in the rows. Note that conditional in receiving the program, the randomization into the incentivized or non-incentivized 
version of the program was always perfectly followed. 
  40 
Table 3: Impact on targeted outcomes 
 






































  (1)  (2) (3) (4)    (5) (6) (7)    (8)  (9) (10) 
Number prenatal visits  7.447  0.333  -0.280  0.6129***    0.156  -0.025  0.181    0.235  -0.136  0.3706** 
 [4.2935]  (0.233)  (0.200)  (0.220)    (0.192) (0.188) (0.173)   (0.155) (0.139) (0.147) 
Delivery by trained midwife  0.670  0.034  0.040  -0.005    0.011  -0.008  0.019    0.023  0.014  0.009 
 [0.4705]  (0.026)  (0.026)  (0.025)    (0.021) (0.023) (0.021)   (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) 
Number of postnatal visits  1.720  -0.169  -0.065  -0.104   -0.034 -0.031 -0.003    -0.099 -0.051 -0.048 
 [2.4477]  (0.140)  (0.120)  (0.140)    (0.129) (0.124) (0.129)   (0.099) (0.091) (0.101) 
Iron tablet sachets  1.588  0.129  0.050  0.078    0.076  0.045  0.031    0.1008*  0.049  0.052 
 [1.2554]  (0.084)  (0.081)  (0.081)    (0.058) (0.065) (0.063)   (0.052) (0.052) (0.051) 
Percent of immunization  0.653  0.025  0.010  0.015    0.010  -0.007  0.017    0.018  0.002  0.016 
 [0.3664]  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.018)    (0.015) (0.015) (0.014)   (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) 
Number of weight checks  2.126  0.1633***  0.068  0.0958*    0.1747***  0.1983***  -0.024    0.1672***  0.1394***  0.028 
 [1.1895]  (0.052)  (0.049)  (0.054)    (0.055) (0.052) (0.051)   (0.041) (0.039) (0.040) 
Number Vitamin A   1.529  -0.008  0.005  -0.013    0.0847*  0.002  0.083    0.038  0.000  0.037 
supplements [1.1370]  (0.052)  (0.055)  (0.058)    (0.048) (0.054) (0.053)   (0.035) (0.040) (0.038) 
Percent malnourished  0.168  -0.016  0.011  -0.0265*   -0.017  -0.0262* 0.009   -0.016 -0.009 -0.006 
 [0.3739]  (0.016)  (0.015)  (0.016)    (0.014) (0.015) (0.016)   (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) 
Age 7–12 participation rate  0.948  -0.001  0.003  -0.004   0.005  0.0108***  -0.006   0.003  0.0075**  -0.005 
 [0.2221]  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.006)    (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)   (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Age 13–15 participation rate  0.822  -0.0343*  -0.0504**  0.016   0.020 0.013 0.007   -0.004 -0.015 0.011 
 [0.3827]  (0.020)  (0.023)  (0.024)    (0.017) (0.016) (0.014)   (0.014) (0.016) (0.014) 
Age 7–12 gross attendance  0.904  0.001  0.002  -0.001    0.003  0.004  -0.001    0.002  0.003  -0.001 
 [0.2773]  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.006)    (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)   (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) 
Age 13–15 gross attendance  0.768  -0.0405*  -0.0651***  0.025   0.025 0.016 0.010   -0.005 -0.020 0.015 
 [0.4125]  (0.021)  (0.024)  (0.025)    (0.018) (0.017) (0.015)   (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) 
                      
Average standardized effect    0.014  -0.022  0.036    0.0502**  0.0320*  0.018    0.0345**  0.010  0.025 
   (0.023)  (0.021)  (0.024)    (0.020)  (0.018) (0.019)   (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.016) 
Average standardized effect     0.0526**  0.012  0.0406*    0.0515**  0.026  0.026    0.0516***  0.020  0.0316* 
health   (0.024)  (0.023)  (0.024)    (0.023)  (0.022) (0.022)   (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.018) 
Average standardized effect     -0.063  -0.0899**  0.027    0.048  0.0449*  0.003    0.000  -0.011  0.011 
educ.   (0.039)  (0.045)  (0.045)    (0.029)  (0.027) (0.027)   (0.026)  (0.029)  (0.026) 
                      
Total points    0.614  -1.717  2.3306*    2.8330**  2.0873*  0.746    1.7969*  0.403  1.394 
(millions)   (1.365)  (1.255)  (1.408)    (1.247) (1.149) (1.176)   (1.011) (0.958) (0.997) 
Total points health    1.8646*  0.135  1.7298*    1.9166*  1.334  0.583    1.8614**  0.788  1.074 
(millions)   (0.971)  (0.920)  (1.001)    (0.983) (0.979) (0.969)   (0.765) (0.759) (0.797) 
Total points education    -1.2507*  -1.8514**  0.601    0.916  0.754  0.163    -0.065  -0.385  0.320 
(millions)   (0.712)  (0.823)  (0.836)    (0.585) (0.554) (0.516)   (0.495) (0.553) (0.494) 41 
Notes: Column 1 shows the baseline mean of the variable shown, with standard deviations in brackets. Each row of columns (2) – (4), (5) – (7), and (8) – (10) show coefficients from a regression of the variable shown on an 
incentive treatment dummy, a non-incentive treatment dummy, district fixed effects, province * group P fixed effects, and baseline means, as described in the text. Robust standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for clustering 
at the subdistrict level. In columns (2) – (4) the treatment variable is defined based on year 1 program placement, and in columns (5) – (7) it is defined based on year 2 program placement, and in columns (8) – (10), which 
uses pooled data from both waves, it is defined as year 1 placement for the Wave II data and as year 2 placement for the Wave III data. All treatment variables are defined using the original randomizations combined with 
eligibility rules, rather than actual program implementation, and so are interpretable as intent-to-treat estimates. Columns (4), (7), and (10) are the calculated difference between the previous two columns. Average 
standardized effects and total points reported in the bottom rows are calculated using the estimated coefficients from the 12 individual regressions above using the formula shown in the text, adjusted for arbitrary cross-
equation clustering of standard errors within subdistricts. * = 10% significance, ** = 5% significance, *** = 1% significance.  42 
Table 4: Interactions with baseline level of service delivery 












































































Main 12 indicators  (1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
Number prenatal visits  0.167 0.115  0.052  0.490    -0.045 -0.1456* 0.101  -0.095    0.065 -0.015  0.080  0.158 
  (0.131) (0.117)  (0.133)  (0.365)    (0.080) (0.082)  (0.083)  (0.284)    (0.080) (0.071)  (0.082)  (0.253) 
Delivery by trained midwife  -0.088 0.042  -0.1296*  0.050    -0.056 0.049  -0.105  0.065    -0.074 0.040  -0.1143**  0.0588* 
  (0.074) (0.070)  (0.071)  (0.046)    (0.071) (0.076)  (0.068)  (0.042)    (0.055) (0.056)  (0.053)  (0.034) 
Number of postnatal visits  -0.141 -0.039  -0.102  0.012    -0.2502* -0.061 -0.189  0.221    -0.1904** -0.043  -0.147  0.123 
  (0.126) (0.130)  (0.142)  (0.193)    (0.137) (0.128)  (0.136)  (0.182)    (0.094) (0.101)  (0.103)  (0.142) 
Iron tablet sachets  -0.142 -0.206  0.064  0.044    0.009 0.160  -0.151  0.116    -0.082 -0.020  -0.061  0.086 
  (0.126) (0.130)  (0.152)  (0.111)    (0.124) (0.143)  (0.153)  (0.097)    (0.093) (0.093)  (0.111)  (0.074) 
Percent of immunization  -0.1884** -0.086  -0.102  0.041    0.016 0.074  -0.057  0.033    -0.102 -0.021  -0.080  0.0376* 
  (0.085) (0.078)  (0.087)  (0.029)    (0.079) (0.073)  (0.066)  (0.025)    (0.062) (0.057)  (0.056)  (0.020) 
Number of weight checks  -0.071 -0.086  0.016  0.083    -0.065 0.000  -0.065  0.022    -0.069 -0.043  -0.025  0.045 
  (0.098) (0.099)  (0.106)  (0.108)    (0.110) (0.115)  (0.129)  (0.120)    (0.069) (0.086)  (0.094)  (0.093) 
Number Vitamin A supplements  -0.030 -0.024  -0.007  -0.008    -0.001 -0.044 0.043  0.060    -0.013 -0.037 0.024  0.026 
  (0.128) (0.115)  (0.154)  (0.096)    (0.115) (0.130)  (0.133)  (0.085)    (0.085) (0.093)  (0.106)  (0.065) 
Percent malnourished  -0.2564** -0.100  -0.156  -0.0481*    -0.2677** -0.2400**  -0.028  0.006    -0.2591*** -0.1657**  -0.093  -0.020 
  (0.129) (0.113)  (0.138)  (0.027)    (0.132) (0.116)  (0.128)  (0.027)    (0.095) (0.078)  (0.100)  (0.021) 
Age 7–12 gross enrollment  -0.042 -0.087  0.045  -0.007    -0.114 -0.1800** 0.066 -0.011    -0.074 -0.129 0.055  -0.009 
  (0.090) (0.106)  (0.127)  (0.012)    (0.094) (0.081)  (0.098)  (0.010)    (0.066) (0.080)  (0.091)  (0.009) 
Age 13–15 gross enrollment  -0.063 -0.079  0.016  0.013    -0.006 -0.115 0.110  -0.021    -0.036 -0.100 0.065  -0.006 
  (0.120) (0.121)  (0.149)  (0.044)    (0.109) (0.098)  (0.101)  (0.028)    (0.085) (0.090)  (0.098)  (0.028) 
Age 7–12 gross attendance  -0.051 -0.045  -0.006  0.000  -0.1064** -0.1085**  0.002  -0.001  -0.0738** -0.0721**  -0.002  -0.001 
  (0.039) (0.039)  (0.033)  (0.006)  (0.050) (0.049)  (0.034)  (0.007)  (0.032) (0.031)  (0.027)  (0.005) 
Age 13–15 gross attendance  -0.052 -0.033  -0.019  0.031  -0.022 -0.110 0.087  -0.016  -0.037 -0.077 0.040  0.004 
(0.111) (0.109)  (0.133)  (0.048)  (0.108) (0.078)  (0.099)  (0.032)  (0.080) (0.073)  (0.087)  (0.029) 
                         
Average standardized effect  -0.2140** -0.157  -0.057  0.056    -0.1919** -0.2225***  0.031  0.025    -0.2055*** -0.1957**  -0.010  0.037 
  (0.096) (0.112)  (0.133)  (0.042)    (0.091) (0.085)  (0.088)  (0.033)    (0.065) (0.079)  (0.087)  (0.029) 
Average standardized effect health  -0.1975*** -0.078 -0.1193*  0.0706*    -0.106 -0.020  -0.086  0.061    -0.1615*** -0.059 -0.1022**  0.0638** 
  (0.061) (0.056)  (0.068)  (0.037)    (0.066) (0.066)  (0.064)  (0.039)    (0.047) (0.045)  (0.051)  (0.031) 
Average standardized effect educ.  -0.247 -0.314  0.067  0.026    -0.363 -0.6274*** 0.264  -0.048    -0.2934* -0.4685**  0.175  -0.017 
(0.253) (0.312)  (0.369)  (0.086)    (0.244) (0.219)  (0.235)  (0.050)    (0.174) (0.221)  (0.241)  (0.051) 
                          
Notes: See Notes to Table 3. Columns (1), (5), and (9) interact the incentive treatment dummy with the baseline subdistrict mean of the variable shown, and columns (2), (5), and (10) interact the non-incentive treatment 
dummy with the baseline subdistrict mean of the variable shown. Columns (3), (7), and (11) are the difference between the two previous columns. Columns (4), (8), and (12) show the estimated additional impact of incentives 
evaluated at the 10
th percentile of the indicator at baseline.43 
 Table 5: Spillovers on non-targeted indicators, average standardized effects by indicator family. 
     Wave II  Wave III  AVERAGE 



































Health                  
Utilization  of  non-incentivized    0.019  -0.010 0.029  0.029  0.011 0.018  0.023 0.001  0.022 
health services    (0.020)  (0.021)  (0.022)  (0.021) (0.020)  (0.019)  (0.016) (0.015)  (0.016) 
Health services quality    0.0901**  0.0752*  0.015  0.041  0.040  0.001  0.0646**  0.0567**  0.008 
   (0.039)  (0.039)  (0.040) (0.036)  (0.038) (0.036)  (0.029) (0.029)  (0.028) 
Maternal knowledge and     0.026  0.024  0.002  0.033  0.043  -0.011  0.029  0.034  -0.005 
practices   (0.029)  (0.028)  (0.030)  (0.029) (0.027)  (0.026)  (0.022) (0.022)  (0.021) 
Family composition decisions    0.014  -0.012  0.026  0.023  -0.007  0.029  0.025  -0.014  0.0381* 
   (0.019)  (0.021)  (0.022) (0.022)  (0.026) (0.023)  (0.020) (0.024)  (0.022) 
Education                  
Other enrollment metrics    -0.070  -0.051  -0.019 -0.013  0.006  -0.019 -0.022  -0.011  -0.012 
   (0.049)  (0.046)  (0.049) (0.021)  (0.020) (0.018)  (0.017) (0.018)  (0.018) 
Transportation to school (cost     -0.077  -0.034 -0.043  0.004  0.022 -0.018  -0.025  0.002  -0.027 
and distance   (0.058)  (0.050)  (0.060) (0.042)  (0.041) (0.042)  (0.036) (0.035)  (0.039) 
Avoiding child labor     -0.025  -0.1074***  0.0825**  0.012  0.007  0.005  -0.006  -0.0391*  0.0335* 
(higher #s = less child labor)    (0.022)  (0.038)  (0.034) (0.025)  (0.020)  (0.022) (0.018)  (0.021)  (0.020) 
                  
Overall   
Average overall standardized     -0.003  -0.017  0.013  0.012  0.007  0.005  0.013  0.004  0.008 
effect   (0.016)  (0.017)  (0.019)  (0.025)  (0.020) (0.022)  (0.010) (0.011)  (0.011) 
Average standardized effect     0.0373**  0.019  0.018  0.012  0.007  0.005  0.0354***  0.020  0.016 
health   (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.017)  (0.025)  (0.020) (0.022)  (0.013) (0.013)  (0.013) 
Average standardized effect     -0.0574**  -0.0643** 0.007  0.012  0.007  0.005  -0.018  -0.016  -0.002 
educ.   (0.029)  (0.030)  (0.032)  (0.025)  (0.020) (0.022)  (0.016) (0.016)  (0.017) 
                   
Notes: See Notes to Table 3. Each row presents average standardized effects from a family of indicators, with the detailed indicator-by-indicator results shown in Appendix Table 4. The individual indicators consist of the 
following : Health utilization consists of deliveries based in facilities (as opposed to at home), use of family planning, use of curative health services, prenatal visits beyond 4 per pregnancy, vitamin A drops beyond 2 per 
child. Health services quality consists of quality of prenatal care services and quality of posyandu services, where quality is measured as the share of services that are supposed to be provided that are actually provided during 
a typical visit. Maternal knowledge and practices are fraction initiating breastfeeding within the first hour after birth, share with exclusive breastfeeding, maternal knowledge about how to proper treatment of several child 
health conditions, and a questions about a women’s role in decisions about children. Family composition is the fertility rate and out migration. Other enrollment metrics are gross high school enrollment, dropout rates, primary 
to junior secondary transition rates, number of hours children attend school, and the numbers attending primary, junior secondary, and senior secondary informal education (Paket A, B, and C). Transportation to school is the 
distance to junior secondary school, time spent traveling one-way to junior secondary school, and transportation cost each way to school. Child labor is the fraction age 7-15 who work for a wage, hours spend working for a 
wage, a dummy for doing any wage work, and a dummy for doing any household work. 44 
Table 6: Manipulation of performance records 






































    (1)  (2) (3)    (4) (5) (6)    (7) (8) (9) 
Panel A: BCG Scar                   
False "yes"  in recorded BCG   0.100  0.0304**  0.006  0.025    -0.002  0.002  -0.003    0.009  0.001  0.008 
vaccine [0.2995]  (0.015)  (0.014) (0.015)    (0.013) (0.014) (0.014)    (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) 
False "yes" in declared BCG   0.122  0.0297*  0.019  0.010    0.007  0.000  0.008    0.014  0.005  0.009 
vaccine [0.3274]  (0.015)  (0.015) (0.016)    (0.014) (0.015) (0.014)    (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Children with no record card  0.195  -0.0481**  -0.0349*  -0.013   -0.020  -0.0515***  0.0314*  -0.0289*  -0.0423***  0.013 
 [0.3963]  (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.019)    (0.019) (0.018)  (0.017)    (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) 
                      
Panel B: Attendance                      
Attend. Rate – difference between  7.299  -2.088  -2.6623* 0.574    0.496  2.158  -1.663    -0.589  0.245  -0.834 
recorded and observed    (1.660)  (1.500)  (1.686)    (2.018) (2.119)  (1.971)    (1.324) (1.266) (1.295) 
Attend. rate observed  88.366  1.348  2.9302**  -1.582   -0.795 -1.975  1.180    0.070 -0.036  0.106 
   (1.577)  (1.466)  (1.617)    (1.885)  (2.024) (1.900)    (1.254)  (1.233)  (1.266) 
Attend. rate recorded  95.726  -0.7465**  0.164  -0.9106**  -0.253  0.160  -0.414   -0.472  0.168  -0.6395* 
   (0.368)  (0.399)  (0.459)    (0.441)  (0.435) (0.441)    (0.306)  (0.308)  (0.333) 
                    
Panel C: Difference between 
admin. and household data 
               
 
Average standardized effect        -0.0952**        -0.084        -0.0772** 
        (0.045)       (0.070)       (0.036) 
Average standardized effect         -0.068        -0.068        -0.064 
health        (0.049)       (0.066)       (0.040) 
Average standardized effect         -0.1433***        -0.111        -0.1007*** 
educ.        (0.053)       (0.096)       (0.039) 
                    
Notes: See Notes to Table 3.  Data from Panel A comes from the household survey. False “yes” is defined as 1 if the child has no observed BCG scar on his/her arm but the records say that the child received the BCG 
immunization. For Panel B, the observed attendance is the percent of students attending on the day of the survey, and the recorded attendance rate is the attendance in the record book on a fixed day prior to the survey taking 
place. For Panel C, the dependent variable is the difference between what is recorded in MIS data for each of the 12 indicators and the corresponding number from the household survey, with average standardized effects 
shown in the table. A positive coefficient would indicate inflation of the program statistics (i.e. MIS is systematically higher than household.) Note that since MIS data is available only for Generasi areas, Panel C only 
compares the incentivized with non-incentivized areas. 45 
Table 7: Do relative payments prevent money from flowing to richer areas? 
  Wave II    Wave III    Pooled 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)    (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)    (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
Panel A: Actual incentive payments                      
Avg. pc exp.  -1.325      -1.749    13.48      15.09    3.891      4.376 
  (7.078)      (6.769)    (12.28)      (12.45)    (6.954)      (6.734) 
Distance to     79,237**    82,873**      83,353**    78,305**      82,429***    82,698*** 
district    (33,578)    (34,038)      (39,741)    (36,635)      (30,403)    (30,027) 
Village       976,885  1,806,000        -2,413,000  -766,739        -484,574  619,756 
poverty rate      (2,980,000)  (2,752,000)        (6,102,000)  (5,976,000)        (3,661,000)  (3,477,000) 
Num obs.  453  453  441  441    388  388  377  377    841  841  818  818 
Panel B: Counter-factual incentive payments without relative performance within subdistricts           
Avg. pc exp.  4.323      4.398    -2.190      -1.052    0.0964      0.457 
  (3.167)      (2.821)    (5.832)      (5.757)    (3.168)      (3.191) 
Distance to     9,320    9,234      3,931    3,075      5,088    3,849 
district    (9,630)    (10,084)      (20,134)    (20,296)      (11,257)    (11,572) 
Village       -6,291,000***  -6,051,000***        -694,340  -702,464        -4,060,000*  -4,000,000* 
poverty rate      (1,942,000)  (1,949,000)        (4,014,000)  (4,025,000)        (2,214,000)  (2,198,000) 
Num obs.  453  453  441  441    388  388  377  377    841  841  818  818 
Notes: Dependent variable is the amount of bonus money given to a village, in Rupiah. Each column reports the result from a separate regression. Each observation is a village. The sample is the 8 sampled villages within 
each of the incentivized subdistricts. Note that MIS data on total points is incomplete for Wave III (second year of program). Standard errors adjusted for clustering by subdistrict.  
Table 8: Change in budget allocations 


























  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6)    (7) (8) (9) 
Panel A: Health vs. education                  
All  health  expenditures  0.4696 0.4320 0.0308*  0.4904 0.4672 0.0304**  0.4812 0.4521 0.0306*** 
     (0.016)    (0.012)     (0.011) 
Health  durables  0.0985 0.0855 0.014  0.1262 0.1086 0.019  0.1140 0.0983 0.0168* 
     (0.012)    (0.012)     (0.010) 
Health  benefiting  providers  0.0166 0.0141 0.004  0.0220 0.0224 0.002  0.0196 0.0192 0.003 
Panel B: Transfers     (0.005)    (0.003)     (0.004) 
All  transfers  0.7312  0.7563 -0.036  0.7281  0.7448 -0.016  0.7295  0.7502 -0.023 
     (0.025)    (0.021)     (0.019) 
Education  supplies  0.2359  0.2745 -0.0463*  0.2360  0.2721 -0.0307*  0.2360  0.2723 -0.0379** 
     (0.024)    (0.018)     (0.017) 
Supplementary  feeding  0.2166 0.1771 0.018  0.2122 0.2130 0.004  0.2141 0.1977 0.010 
     (0.014)    (0.012)     (0.010) 
Subsidies  0.2787 0.3048  -0.007  0.2799 0.2597 0.012  0.2793 0.2802 0.005 
     (0.024)    (0.019)     (0.018) 
Uniform  unit  values  146,132 158,407 -45,200  108,789 100,702 12,967  124,568 123,103 -9,500 
        (58,374)          (12,271)          (23,377) 
Notes: See Notes to Table 3. A unit of observation is a village. Since budget data is only available for treatment areas, columns (3), (6), and (9) regress the variable shown on a variable for being an incentive subdistrict.  46 
Table 9: Direct benefits received, incentivized vs. non-incentivized 




































   (1)  (2)  (3)    (4)  (5)  (6)    (7)  (8)  (9) 
                        
Received scholarship  0.025  0.0162** 0.008  0.009  0.0208** 0.009  0.012  0.0187*** 0.008  0.0108* 
 [0.0048]  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.008)  (0.009) (0.007) (0.009)  (0.005) (0.005)  (0.006) 
Received uniform  0.013  0.1095*** 0.0828***  0.027 0.0824***  0.0723*** 0.010  0.0948*** 0.0777***  0.017 
 [0.0036]  (0.019)  (0.012)  (0.018)  (0.013) (0.010) (0.015)  (0.013) (0.008)  (0.012) 
Value of uniforms  (Rp.)  731  7,845***  6,098***  1,746  7,122***  5,936***  1,186  7,451***  6,028***  1,423 
  [271]    (1,569)    (1,034)    (1,447)    (1,312)    (1,117)    (1,521)    (1,264)    (845)    (1,225) 
Received other school   0.008  0.0634*** 0.0535***  0.010  0.0701*** 0.0534*** 0.017  0.0670*** 0.0533*** 0.014 
supplies [0.0027]  (0.012)  (0.009)  (0.012)  (0.012) (0.010) (0.015)  (0.010) (0.007)  (0.011) 
Received transport   0.000  0.0143*** 0.0049*  0.009  0.0078*** 0.0050*** 0.003  0.0108*** 0.0051*** 0.0056* 
subsidy [0.0000]  (0.005)  (0.003)  (0.006)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)  (0.003) (0.002)  (0.003) 
Received other school   0.000  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.0072** 0.0063*  0.001 0.0039**  0.0033* 0.001 
support [0.0000]  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)  (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) 
Received supp. feeding at   0.000  0.005  0.0041** 0.001  0.006 0.003  0.003 0.005  0.004  0.002 
school [0.0000]  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.004)  (0.006) (0.005) (0.007)  (0.004) (0.003)  (0.004) 
Received supp. feeding at   0.469  0.1533*** 0.1563***  -0.003 0.1745***  0.2044***  -0.030 0.1647***  0.1843*** -0.020 
posyandu [0.0171]  (0.028)  (0.027)  (0.028)  (0.025) (0.022) (0.023)  (0.022) (0.019)  (0.019) 
Received intensive supp.   0.027  0.008 0.0252**  -0.018  0.0242** 0.0191** 0.005  0.0173*** 0.0212*** -0.004 
feeding at school  [0.0055]  (0.007)  (0.011)  (0.011) (0.010)  (0.009)  (0.010)  (0.007) (0.007)  (0.007) 
Received health subsidy   0.005  0.0343*** 0.0270***  0.007  0.0273*** 0.0364***  -0.009  0.0304*** 0.0323*** -0.002 
for pre/postnatal care  [0.0023]  (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.009) (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.009) (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.007) 
Received health subsidy   0.039  0.1010*** 0.1273***  -0.026  0.0974*** 0.1249***  -0.028  0.0991*** 0.1260*** -0.027 
for childbirth  [0.0078]  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.019)  (0.016) (0.020) (0.023)  (0.012) (0.015)  (0.016) 
                    
Average standardized     0.3394***  0.2995***  0.040  0.3076***  0.2950***  0.013  0.3526***  0.3140***  0.039 
effect   (0.041)  (0.030)  (0.040)  (0.031)  (0.028) (0.039)  (0.032)  (0.026) (0.035) 
Average standardized     0.2847***  0.3122***  -0.028 0.2657***  0.3136***  -0.048  0.3179***  0.3620***  -0.044 
effect health    (0.037)  (0.031)  (0.039)  (0.031) (0.035) (0.042)  (0.039) (0.040)  (0.047) 
Average standardized     0.3940***  0.2867***  0.1073*  0.3495***  0.2764***  0.073  0.3734***  0.2852***  0.0883* 
effect educ.    (0.063)  (0.041)  (0.060)  (0.049) (0.041) (0.059)  (0.045) (0.032)  (0.046) 
                        
Note: See Notes to Table 3. Note that instead of showing a baseline mean, we show the wave II control group mean because there is no data available for these categories in Wave I. These regressions also therefore do not 
control for baseline values. Note that avg. standardized effects do not include value of uniforms since this variable wasn’t pre-specified in the analysis plan. Value of uniforms is coded as 0 if the HH doesn’t receive the 
uniforms.  47 
Table 10: Worker Behavior  





































Midwives:                      
Hours spent in outreach over past 3   3.165  0.7961*  -0.074  0.8700**    0.076 0.038 0.038   0.391 0.007 0.383 
days [4.4875]  (0.410)  (0.337)  (0.425)    (0.389) (0.419) (0.400)   (0.299) (0.305) (0.327) 
Hours spent providing public services   13.548  0.536  -1.1020*  1.6380**    0.675  0.417  0.257    0.579  -0.248  0.8272* 
over past 3 days  [10.0559]  (0.608)  (0.594)  (0.721)    (0.619) (0.567) (0.585)   (0.460) (0.419) (0.487) 
Hours  spent  providing  private  services    10.805  0.212  -0.469  0.681   0.894 0.591 0.304   0.570 0.112 0.458 
over past 3 days  [12.5048]  (0.832)  (0.826)  (0.886)    (0.674) (0.669) (0.644)   (0.525) (0.524) (0.524) 
Total hours spent working over past 3   27.518  1.477  -1.7182*  3.1956***    1.6276*  0.936  0.692    1.5004**  -0.224  1.7246** 
days [15.7132]  (1.047)  (1.039)  (1.154)    (0.951) (0.932) (0.884)   (0.712) (0.728) (0.723) 
Number of posyandus attended in past   4.166  0.189  0.059  0.130    -0.162  0.053  -0.215    -0.009  0.064  -0.073 
Month [3.3213]  (0.332)  (0.227)  (0.348)    (0.247) (0.268) (0.324)   (0.241) (0.195) (0.294) 
Number of hours midwife per   3.039  0.137  0.181  -0.044    0.110  -0.083  0.192    0.127  0.032  0.095 
posyandu [1.6932]  (0.130)  (0.120)  (0.127)    (0.152) (0.133) (0.153)   (0.111) (0.095) (0.111) 
Teachers:                   
Percent present at time of interview   .  0.006  0.016  -0.010    0.000  0.008  -0.009    0.006  0.016  -0.010 
(primary) [.]  (0.016)  (0.015)  (0.017)    (0.011) (0.011) (0.012)   (0.016) (0.015) (0.017) 
Percent present at time of interview   .  0.001  -0.010  0.011   -0.008  -0.015  0.007   -0.004  -0.013  0.009 
(junior secondary)  [.]  (0.015)  (0.014)  (0.014)    (0.012) (0.012) (0.013)   (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Percent observed teaching (primary) .  -0.006  -0.050  0.044   -0.003  -0.012 0.009   -0.005  -0.028 0.023 
 [.]  (0.038)  (0.042)  (0.042)    (0.040)  (0.041) (0.038)   (0.028) (0.029) (0.028) 
Percent observed teaching (j. sec.)   .  -0.069  -0.052 -0.018   0.039 0.024 0.015   -0.010 -0.011 0.002 
 [.]  (0.044)  (0.047)  (0.049)    (0.049)  (0.048) (0.044)   (0.033) (0.033) (0.032) 
Puskesmas:                   
Minutes wait at recent health visits 25.201  0.778 6.035 -5.257   2.409 1.281 1.128   1.696 3.042  -1.345 
 [23.7360]  (3.637)  (4.685)  (3.953)    (4.269) (4.224) (4.400)   (3.033) (3.302) (3.320) 
Percent of providers present at time of   .  0.0714**  0.1090***  -0.038    -0.009  -0.0757**  0.0667**    0.030  0.006  0.024 
observation [.]  (0.036)  (0.039)  (0.035)    (0.029) (0.030) (0.030)   (0.022) (0.023) (0.024) 
      
Average  standardized  effect    0.045  -0.040  0.0846***    0.043 0.021 0.021   0.0409*  -0.005 0.0463* 
   (0.029)  (0.028)  (0.032)    (0.028)  (0.028) (0.030)   (0.022) (0.020) (0.024) 
Average  standardized  effect  health    0.0892**  -0.036  0.1250***    0.056 0.030 0.026   0.0665**  0.000 0.0662** 
   (0.044)  (0.038)  (0.048)    (0.040)  (0.039) (0.040)   (0.031) (0.028) (0.034) 
Average standardized effect educ.    -0.022  -0.046  0.024   0.023 0.009 0.014   0.002  -0.014 0.016 
 (0.043)  (0.044)  (0.047)    (0.041)  (0.042) (0.042)   (0.030) (0.029) (0.030) 
                        
Note: See Notes to Table 3. 48 
Table 11: Community effort 





































Community effort at direct service 
provision: 
               
Number of posyandus in village  4.5191  -0.092  0.004 -0.096    0.128  0.196 -0.068    0.027  0.107  -0.080 
 [3.5043]  (0.124)  (0.147)  (0.126)    (0.178) (0.176)  (0.148)    (0.140) (0.151) (0.120) 
Number of posyandu meetings in   .  -0.003  0.082 -0.084    -0.112 -0.063 -0.049  -0.061  0.002  -0.063 
past year at selected posyandu  [.]  (0.102)  (0.111)  (0.102)   (0.112)  (0.091)  (0.100)  (0.079)  (0.076)  (0.078) 
Number of cadres at posyandu  .  0.174  0.197  -0.023    0.2890**  0.3577**  -0.069    0.2349**  0.2854**  -0.051 
  [.]  (0.113) (0.153)  (0.138)    (0.139) (0.171) (0.165)    (0.105)  (0.139)  (0.133) 
Community effort at outreach      
Number of sweepings at selected   .  -0.296  0.042  -0.338   -0.127  -0.6155* 0.4888*   -0.186  -0.337  0.150 
posyandu in last year  [.]  (0.394)  (0.377)  (0.389)   (0.342)  (0.346)  (0.295)   (0.266)  (0.257)  (0.257) 
Number of primary school comm..  .  0.066  -0.070  0.136    0.002  -0.125  0.126    0.031  -0.099  0.130 
meetings with parents in past year  [.]  (0.133)  (0.133)  (0.121)   (0.181)  (0.182)  (0.137)  (0.117)  (0.119)  (0.093) 
Number of junior sec. school   2.3093  -0.121  0.032  -0.153    0.213  0.210  0.003    0.066  0.125  -0.060 
committee meetings w parents  [1.9728] (0.113)  (0.118)  (0.126)  (0.147)  (0.223) (0.207)    (0.103)  (0.147)  (0.140) 
Community effort at monitoring      
Number of primary school   .  0.7613*  -0.503  1.2638***    -0.003  0.195  -0.198    0.317  -0.085  0.401 
committee members  [.]  (0.392)  (0.410)  (0.478)    (0.334) (0.402)  (0.344)    (0.287) (0.314) (0.297) 
Number of junior sec school   8.2592  -0.845  -1.421 0.577    0.199  0.231 -0.032    -0.296  -0.511  0.215 
committee members  [4.7625]  (0.993)  (0.934)  (0.539)    (0.332) (0.332)  (0.291)    (0.498) (0.475) (0.297) 
Number of prim. school committee   .  -0.124  -0.367  0.243  -0.121  -0.096  -0.025  -0.129  -0.213  0.084 
meetings with teachers in past year  [.] (0.358)  (0.357)  (0.354)   (0.316)  (0.319)  (0.268)  (0.255)  (0.252) (0.211) 
Number of j. sec. school committee   4.4761  0.477  0.132  0.345    0.530  0.5755*  -0.045    0.4957*  0.381  0.115 
meetings with teachers in year  [5.4650] (0.424)  (0.394)  (0.455)  (0.342)  (0.346)  (0.364)  (0.262)  (0.258) (0.269) 
    
Average standardized effect     0.014  -0.009  0.023    0.0431*  0.048  -0.004    0.026  0.017  0.010 
  (0.022) (0.025)  (0.023)    (0.025) (0.031) (0.029)    (0.018)  (0.022)  (0.019) 
                       
Note: See Notes to Table 3.   
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Table 12: Within-subdistrict targeting  
































































Panel A: Targeting of direct benefits                
Average standardized     -0.036  0.032  -0.068 -0.076  -0.059  -0.017 -0.065  -0.029  -0.036 
effect   (0.212)  (0.167)  (0.268)  (0.098)  (0.130) (0.155)  (0.087)  (0.088) (0.110) 
Average standardized     -0.050  0.070  -0.120 -0.060  -0.061  0.002 -0.071  -0.022  -0.049 
effect health    (0.296)  (0.256)  (0.390)  (0.166) (0.234)  (0.273)  (0.131) (0.153)  (0.179) 
Average standardized     -0.019  -0.016  -0.003 -0.093  -0.057  -0.036 -0.059  -0.036  -0.022 
effect educ.    (0.220)  (0.103)  (0.231)  (0.084) (0.079)  (0.103)  (0.090) (0.065)  (0.101) 
                        
Panel B: Heterogeneity in improvements in main indicators 
Average standardized effect    -0.075  0.007  -0.082 0.062  0.054  0.008  -0.017  0.031  -0.048 
   (0.065)  (0.074)  (0.085)  (0.075)  (0.066) (0.068)  (0.847)  (0.773) (0.922) 
Average standardized effect     -0.078  0.057  -0.135  0.133  0.038  0.095  0.020  0.043  -0.024 
health   (0.078)  (0.080)  (0.092)  (0.097)  (0.087) (0.091)  (0.731)  (0.632) (0.752) 
Average standardized effect     -0.068  -0.093  0.025 -0.078  0.087  -0.1651*  -0.090  0.006  -0.097 
educ.   (0.096)  (0.129)  (0.143)  (0.084)  (0.091) (0.084)  (1.234)  (1.193) (1.397) 
                        
Notes: For each indicator, the regression interacts the Generasi treatment variables for a dummy for a household being in the top 3 quintiles of the baseline per-capita consumption distribution. 
Average standardized effects for the interaction with the top 3 quintiles variable are shown in the table.  Panel A examines the indicators of direct benefits shown in Table 9 and Panel B examines the 
12 main program indicators examined in Table 3. 50 
Table 13: Cost-effectiveness Calculation 












































Panel A: Social  
Cost Effectiveness Entire  program     
Transfers  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00             
Non-transfers  3.91 3.68 0.23 0.00 0.00             
Facilitation  2.54 2.54 0.00  18.40  18.40             
Marginal cost public funds  5.07  5.07  0.00  32.04  32.04             
Total  costs    11.51 11.28  0.23 50.44 50.44             
( m i l l i o n s   U S D )                
Millions  of  points  1.42 1.04 0.373  2.24 4.46             
               
Dollars  per  point  8.13 10.81  0.62 22.43 11.30             
               
Panel B: Social Cost 
Effectiveness by Area  Health   Education 
Transfers  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00    0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Non-transfers  2.24 1.97 0.28 0.00 0.00    1.63 1.68  -0.05 0.00 0.00 
Facilitation  1.27 1.27 0.00  21.72  21.72    1.27 1.27 0.00  21.72  21.72 
Marginal cost public funds  2.87  2.77  0.10  16.02  16.02    2.95  3.05  -0.10  16.02  16.02 
Total  costs  6.39 6.01 0.38  37.74  37.74    5.85 6.00  -0.15  37.74  37.74 
( m i l l i o n s   U S D )                
Millions  of  points  0.96 0.67 0.291  2.25 4.47    0.46 0.38 0.081  0.00 0.00 
               
Dollars  per  point  6.66 9.01 1.30  16.78 8.45    12.78  15.93  N/A N/A N/A 
               
Notes: Note that the costs and points for Generasi have been divided by 2, so that in this calculation exactly half the benefits and costs have been allocated to the program with and without incentives. The 
estimated points are therefore 50% of the estimated numbers in Table 3 above. PKH calculations are authors calculations based on the coefficients given in Alatas et. al (2010), as well as authors’ calculations 
of the average number of beneficiaries of different age ranges per PKH household based on the PKH wave 3 survey. For health and education, we allocate the facilitation costs and PKH transfers 50-50 between 
health and education, and allocate actual Generasi expenditures based on the actual distribution of expenditures between health and education in the MIS data. 